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FRAMING MIDDLE-CLASS INSECURITY:  
TAX AND THE IDEOLOGY OF UNEQUAL 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Martha T. McCluskey* 
INTRODUCTION 
Tax law has helped make struggle, risk, and sacrifice the new normal for 
the American middle class.  This change in middle-class status results not 
only from tax policies, but also from ideas about tax that cultivate 
acquiescence in unequal austerity.1 
As Lisa Philipps shows in the context of Canada, recent income tax 
policies encourage middle-class citizens to rely more on their own private 
family wealth and personal human capital—and less on collective public 
protection—to secure middle-class expectations of access to health care, 
education, income security, family, retirement, and economic opportunity.2  
Yet, as Philipps explains, those tax policies of self-reliance clash with a 
reality in which middle-class earnings and savings are increasingly 
precarious, if not substantially out of reach.  That reality of middle-class 
vulnerability is even more pronounced in the United States, with more 
limited public support for health care, retirement, and higher education. 
This insecurity has grown even as middle-class American households 
generally have taken greater responsibility for economic gain by increasing 
work productivity, upgrading educational attainment, and working more 
hours.3  From 1971 to 2015, U.S. household income overall has shifted 
upward from middle-income to upper-tier households, leaving the middle 
 
*  Professor of Law and William J. Magavern Faculty Scholar, SUNY Buffalo Law School.  
Thanks to Linda Sugin and Mary Louise Fellows for organizing the Fordham Law Review 
symposium entitled We Are What We Tax and to Lisa Philipps and other participants at the 
symposium for rich and inspiring discussion and comments guiding this Article.  For an 
overview of the symposium, see Mary Louise Fellows, Grace Heinecke & Linda Sugin, 
Foreword:  We Are What We Tax, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2413 (2016). 
 
 1. See generally STEVE FRASER, THE AGE OF ACQUIESCENCE:  THE LIFE AND DEATH OF 
AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO ORGANIZED WEALTH AND POWER (2015) (comparing current 
passivity with previous eras of mass political mobilization). 
 2. See generally Lisa Philipps, Registered Savings Plans and the Making of Middle-
Class Canada:  Toward a Performative Theory of Tax Policy, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2677 
(2016). 
 3. See LAWRENCE MISHEL, ECON. POLICY INST., VAST MAJORITY OF WAGE EARNERS 
ARE WORKING HARDER, AND FOR NOT MUCH MORE:  TRENDS IN U.S. WORK HOURS AND 
WAGES OVER 1979–2007, at 1 (2013), http://www.epi.org/files/2013/ib348-trends-us-work-
hours-wages-1979-2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MK9-8H4B]. 
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class both smaller in size and squeezed economically.4  In 2013, upper-
income families had seven times the wealth of middle-income families, 
compared to three times the wealth of middle income families in 1983.5  
The upper 10 percent have received an increasing share of gains from 
business cycles since the 1980s compared to the bottom 90 percent of 
households and all of the gains from growth during the 2000 to 2008 
business cycle.6 
How we think about tax shapes how we think about this new redivision 
of the economic “pie.”  Tax policies championing security through 
individual savings do not simply promote the ideal of personal economic 
responsibility for economic loss and insecurity.  More insidiously, these 
policies convey the message that good middle-class citizenship is about 
accepting low expectations of personal economic success.  The prevailing 
scholarly and popular tax discourse helps rationalize increased middle-class 
risk and sacrifice as an economic fact beyond politics. 
This discourse largely presumes that middle-class economic power and 
prosperity does not come from democratic solidarity and collective 
protection.  Instead, it echoes a neoliberal vision that embraces government 
support as a foundation of economic success, but insists that success 
depends on redirecting government support away from ordinary workers, 
families, and consumers toward protecting concentrated private market 
wealth as the primary engine of economic prosperity.  That vision identifies 
middle-class status with incapacity, insecurity, and dependency in a new 
and naturally unequal economic order. 
A more accurate understanding of the role of tax in the political economy 
can help challenge this neoliberal reconstruction of the middle class.  
Government taxing and spending is fundamental, not supplemental, to the 
seemingly private market order.  Tax policy inevitably operates to lead, not 
just to follow or distort, the “normal” production and distribution of 
economic power.  Tax policy, in a democratic government, can and should 
be a means for ordinary citizens to participate in constructive collective 
control over economic production for their benefit. 
This Article first explains how the prevailing discourse frames federal tax 
support for the middle class as either consumption or redistribution, both of 
which appear to be essentially unproductive and potentially destructive.  
Second, this Article examines the expansion of state and local tax support 
for elite private capital.  In contrast to tax support favoring the middle class, 
this upper-class support is accepted widely as necessary for productive 
economic development.  Operating below the radar of prominent tax 
 
 4. For instance, 49 percent of U.S. aggregate income went to upper-income households 
in 2014, up from 29 percent in 1970. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS IS 
LOSING GROUND:  NO LONGER THE MAJORITY AND FALLING BEHIND FINANCIALLY 4 (2015). 
 5. Id. at 8. 
 6. Pavlina Tcherneva, What’s Wrong with David Leonhardt’s NYT Piece on 
Inequality?, NEW ECON. PERSP. (Feb. 19, 2015), http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2015/ 
02/whats-wrong-with-david-leonhardts-nyt-piece-on-inequality.html [https://perma.cc/ 
L3G5-5TTJ]. 
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debates, this state and local tax policy reveals more starkly and perversely 
how prevailing views of tax rationalize inequality and austerity.  This 
Article concludes by defending the core regulatory and productive function 
of the democratic tax system, grounded in the legitimate collective power of 
middle- and lower-income households to make the economy more 
responsible to their interests. 
I.  TAX AS FRUGAL SPENDING OR PROFLIGATE TAKING? 
The message of middle-class subordination emerges from a conceptual 
framework of tax that appears to reflect benign common sense.  That frame 
presents two primary functions for tax policy.7  First and foremost, taxes 
raise revenue to finance public spending.  This goal typically is analyzed in 
terms of efficiency:  the extent to which taxes raise the maximum revenue 
at the least cost.8  Tax scholars widely discuss tax efficiency as a question 
of objective analysis of the degree to which a given tax “distorts” what are 
assumed to otherwise be normal resource-maximizing market decisions.9  
Second, taxes can redistribute resources from some private interests to 
others.10  This distributive goal is assumed to be a matter of contested 
subjective political and moral judgments about fairness.11 
Beneath its innocuous surface, this foundational division nonetheless 
operates to rationalize and normalize the rising inequality and austerity for 
the middle class.  It presumptively locates economic productivity in a 
distinct and underlying private sector, with government taxing and spending 
essentially cast as derivative and dependent on gain largely generated 
elsewhere.  In this frame, middle-class taxpaying serves one of two primary 
purposes:  either consumption of government commodities or forced 
charity.  As discussed below, each of these alternatives casts tax support 
favoring the middle class as suspect, so that this tax support appears 
unreasonable unless sharply limited. 
A.  Middle Class Submission in Tax “Consumption” 
As taxpaying consumers of public goods and services, middle-class 
citizens can appear rational and responsible to the extent they curtail their 
demands on the government to  match their willingness to cover the costs 
 
 7. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Equity Versus Efficiency and the U.S. Tax System in 
Historical Perspective, in TAX JUSTICE:  THE ONGOING DEBATE 25, 25–70 (Joseph J. 
Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002) (analyzing the shift from emphasis on 
distributional equity to the goal of efficiency). 
 8. See Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 TAX L. 
REV. 229, 229 (2011). 
 9. See id. at 233 (advocating for a more complex and complete approach). 
 10. See Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax Law and Economics, 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 523, 525, 535–36 (2013) (describing taxation as a system of zero-sum 
transfers in contrast to the ideal of a market bargain producing mutual gain). 
 11. See id. at 529–30 (explaining that conventional economic analysis claims to eschew 
the contested questions of redistribution implicated in tax law). 
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by paying more taxes.12  In this view, taxes—like market prices—should 
help discipline middle-class citizens by inducing them to make inevitably 
tough tradeoffs among competing government spending priorities to 
maximize resources assumed to be naturally and necessarily scarce.13  In 
this presumed consumer role, rational middle-class taxpayers should also 
weigh their personal gains from government spending against the possible 
personal gain from substituting private spending or savings for the cost of 
the taxes needed to “buy” public goods or services. 
In the current economic context, most middle-class taxpayers probably 
realize that individual savings and earnings are unlikely to provide reliable 
personal or family prosperity and security.  Yet this realization may tend to 
further discourage middle-class aspirations for “purchasing” expanded 
collective government support through higher taxes.  The idea of taxpaying 
as consumption, for example, underlies warnings that maintaining current 
levels of social security retirement benefits likely will require either high 
payroll taxes on increasingly struggling younger middle-class workers, or 
government debt that will reduce the security and prosperity of younger 
generations due to some combination of greater taxes, reduced government 
services, and dampened private economic growth.14  If government 
spending for the middle class depends on middle-class taxpaying, then more 
generous middle-class public support will appear largely unaffordable, or at 
least difficult to achieve without resorting to irresponsible and generally 
futile efforts to escape from paying the true costs of these gains.  That is, 
the consumer view of tax largely presents the barriers to greater middle-
class security as fixed and intractable economic constraints. 
B.  Middle Class Submission in Tax “Redistribution” 
Prevailing tax theory appears to soften and offset this gloomy message by 
presenting redistribution as the alternative by which fiscal policy may 
alleviate insecurity and inequality.  Yet, under the surface, this seemingly 
neutral alternative also subtly points toward the conclusion that substantial 
gains for the middle class largely lie beyond the reach of reasonable tax 
policy.  Constructed as “redistribution,” progressive tax policies favoring 
the middle class appear to be one-way involuntary transfers of resources 
 
 12. See, e.g., Scott Horsley, Balancing the Budget:  The Problem Might Be You, NPR 
(Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/02/16/133783606/balancing-the-budget-the-
problem-might-be-you (criticizing ordinary voters for their political support for 
infrastructure spending without similar support for general tax increases) [https://perma.cc/ 
9YSX-39YP]. 
 13. See LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE FORM 1040:  TWO CHEERS FOR THE 
RETURN-BASED MASS INCOME TAX 12 (2013) (discussing arguments that the pain of 
taxpaying induces citizens to carefully limit government spending); Eric M. Zolt, Politics 
and Taxation:  An Introduction, 67 TAX L. REV. 453, 455 (2014) (discussing the “fiscal 
contract” model of taxpaying as a market-like exchange of tax revenue for government 
services according to taxpayer preferences). 
 14. See, e.g., Romina Boccia, Social Security:  $39 Billion Deficit in 2014, Insolvent by 
2035, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 29, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/ 
07/social-security-39-billion-deficit-in-2014-insolvent-by-2035 [https://perma.cc/2E3M-
RDKN]. 
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from more economically capable taxpayers.15  That conceptualization 
implicitly suggests that progressive tax policy primarily aimed at shifting 
resources to the middle class from the rich will tend to make middle-class 
security dependent on the unwilling support of more powerful others. 
Even when that position of dependency appears normatively justified or 
politically popular, it means that middle-class gains from redistributive tax 
policies are likely to be relatively insecure and costly (in the long run) 
compared to any gains from efficient tax policies.  If we assume progressive 
tax policies take private resources from wealthier taxpayers, we can expect 
that these more economically powerful taxpayers are likely to respond by 
diverting or decreasing their private spending and saving to accommodate, 
mitigate, or resist this loss.  But if middle-class economic success largely 
depends on private earnings and savings, even when supplemented by 
government support, then middle-class prosperity may be threatened by any 
“redistribution” that disrupts or weakens the private economic activity of 
those who control the largest share of the private economy.16 
It is true that this logic leaves open to debate and analysis the degree of 
economic risk or blowback to the middle class from any particular 
redistributive tax.  Nonetheless, the conceptual lens of “redistribution” casts 
doubt on the wisdom of using tax policy to protect the middle class.  That 
lens further suggests that middle-class citizens should not trust their own 
political interests or ideals of fairness as the basis for determining the 
proper scope and design of tax benefits for the middle class, but instead 
should defer to technical economic expertise. 
In addition, the idea of redistributive taxation suggests that the presumed 
disruption of otherwise normal economic forces will extend beyond private 
productivity to government functioning.  From the prevailing idea that taxes 
extract private resources to purchase government programs, it follows that 
harm to private economic productivity from “redistributive” taxes will also 
risk reducing tax revenue on which government spending seemingly 
depends, exacerbating the tough choices that already face middle-class tax 
“consumers.”  Further, in contrast to theoretically consensual reciprocal 
economic exchanges, involuntary taxes aimed at helping the middle class at 
the expense of wealthier others will depend on enhanced government 
compulsion to achieve the intended result.17 
Though, in theory, state and federal governments have plenty of force at 
their disposal, in practice, tax enforcement depends on complex 
administration operating under legal, political, and resource constraints.  
The current context of heightened inequality gives more reason for middle-
 
 15. See Raskolnikov, supra note 10, at 525, 535–36 (comparing tax “redistribution” to 
theft and insider trading). 
 16. See Jim Chen, Progressive Taxation:  An Aesthetic and Moral Defense, 50 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 659, 672–73 (2012) (arguing for progressive taxation despite presumed 
negative economic incentive effects). 
 17. See Raskolnikov, supra note 10, at 541 (explaining economic arguments that 
taxation as a compulsory transfer tends to induce costly resistance offsetting at least some of 
the intended gains from the transfer). 
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class citizens to doubt that this bureaucratic machinery will compel the rich 
to hand over an increased share of resources without a hitch.  Taxes 
characterized as redistributive will not only appear especially politically and 
economically controversial, but also will target those with the most to gain 
from (and the most to spend on) manipulating, contesting, and evading 
taxes.18  In their role as rational “consumers” of government spending, as 
well as potential beneficiaries of tax redistribution, middle-class taxpayers 
are faced with the likelihood that the costs of administering and enforcing 
robust redistributive fiscal policies will come at the expense of fewer 
resources for other vital government goods and services.  In fact, building 
on middle-class suspicions of upper-class tax avoidance, political leaders 
have cultivated popular opposition to progressive income taxation on the 
ground that progressivity causes complexity that leads the rich to exploit 
“loopholes” at the expense of the middle class.19 
Further, those with extensive wealth at stake will have reason to resist 
downwardly redistributive taxes by investing in political efforts to 
undermine those policies, whether by cutting resources for tax enforcement, 
lobbying for offsetting tax favors, or directly funding politicians and public 
intellectuals who will discredit redistributive goals, tax progressivity, and 
federal government spending.20  In an electoral context dependent on 
wealthy donors, successful tax initiatives aiding the middle class are likely 
to be packaged with even greater tax concessions for the wealthy (or new 
spending concessions affecting the middle class).  For example, the 2001 to 
2003 Bush Administration tax law changes giving “marriage penalty relief” 
to many middle-class taxpayers also included extensive tax reductions for 
the wealthy.21 
Tax policies portrayed as redistributive, zero-sum transfers to the middle 
class also will appear likely to increase threats to economic security from 
within the middle class.  Proposals for more government support for 
individual health insurance, education, home ownership, or retirement, for 
 
 18. See Noam Scheiber & Patricia Cohen, For the Wealthiest, a Private Tax System That 
Saves Them Billions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/30/ 
business/economy/for-the-wealthiest-private-tax-system-saves-them-billions.html?_r=0 
(reporting how the very wealthiest Americans effectively use their private money and power 
to buy tax policy) [https://perma.cc/EB72-W8C7]. 
 19. See, e.g., Stephanie Condon, Carly Fiorina:  What Does She Stand for?, CBS NEWS 
(Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/media/carly-fiorina-what-does-she-stand-for/4/ 
(reporting that the Republican former presidential candidate promotes the idea of a simple 
three-page federal income tax on the ground that the current “deductions and loopholes and 
complexities actually benefit the wealthy” not the middle class) [https://perma.cc/Y4RT-
BPHN]. 
 20. See generally James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in 
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE:  SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 71 
(Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014) (analyzing how industry influences public 
policy by using identity, status, and relationships to promote its interests and ideology). 
 21. See CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS:  THE 2001 AND 2003 
TAX CUTS (2009) (explaining that a large share of the tax cuts from this legislation will go to 
the top 1 percent of households); Martha T. McCluskey, Taxing the Family Work:  Aid for 
Affluent Husband Care, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 109, 190–92 (2011) (contrasting the 
family tax reforms with the accompanying tax breaks for the wealthy). 
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example, raise middle-class concerns that their own hard-won resources 
will be tapped to benefit less resourceful others.  For example, in response 
to President Obama’s proposal to end some of the Bush Administration’s 
tax breaks for those earning more than $250,000, University of Chicago law 
professor Todd Henderson infamously blogged that this income level 
unfairly extended beyond the rich because his own dual-earner family 
struggled to maintain a middle-class lifestyle despite earning over that 
amount.22  He withdrew his essay under harsh criticism contrasting most 
Americans’ economic problems with his family’s difficulty paying for 
private schools, retirement, a nanny, lawn care, and good housing.23 
Nonetheless, Henderson’s concern reflects the real challenges of 
depending on individual savings and earnings for family security and 
prosperity, even with income much higher and more secure than that 
available to the vast majority of the middle class.  For example, in 2013, a 
New York Times columnist warned that $1 million in family savings could 
well be insufficient to sustain retirement in a middle-class lifestyle through 
a ripe old age, especially in higher cost urban areas, even though 90 percent 
of Americans will save far less than that—and many will save nothing at 
all.24  Without a substantial expansion of public social security benefits, 
almost half of all middle-class American workers will be poor or near poor 
during retirement, and even many high income workers will face a 
substantial drop in living standards.25 
The possibility that insecurity and austerity extends far up the economic 
scale further fuels popular anxiety about the harmful economic impact of 
policies characterized as unproductive “redistributive” transfers.  In an 
economy where exceptional personal discipline and entrepreneurship 
appears ever more necessary for success, “redistributive” tax policies 
compensating those falling short will, by definition, reward and induce 
unsuccessful economic behavior—perhaps including outright fraud and 
manipulation.26  In the prevailing logic, to counter destructive incentive 
effects, “redistributive” programs reasonably should impose conditions and 
penalties aimed at controlling unproductive recipient behavior.  For 
example, the Affordable Care Act’s “individual mandate” to purchase 
health insurance was designed to counteract incentives for middle-class 
 
 22. Ameet Sachdev, Earnings of More than $250,000 a Year, but Professor Laments 
Family Just Getting by, CHICAGO TRIB. (Sept. 23, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/ 
2010-09-23/business/ct-biz-0924-rich-blog-20100923_1_law-professor-blog-taxes [https:// 
perma.cc/9RR8-92HR]. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Jeff Sommer, For Retirees, a Million-Dollar Illusion, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/your-money/why-many-retirees-could-outlive-a-1-
million-nest-egg.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/TX8P-3VJG]. 
 25. Teresa Ghilarducci, Our Ridiculous Approach to Retirement, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/opinion/sunday/our-ridiculous-approach-to-
retirement.html [https://perma.cc/Y2EM-H3MF]. 
 26. See Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship:  Challenging the 
Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 805–07, 850–51 (2003) (analyzing 
economic moral hazard arguments against social welfare programs and showing how these 
rest on problematic moral judgments about unequal bargaining power). 
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consumers to game the system by waiting until illness before buying 
insurance.27  That problem would have been solved by expanding the 
popular single-payer Medicare program, but instead, the public health 
coverage was designed to provide public income-based support for 
purchasing private insurance.28  The resulting system of penalties and 
subsidies likely contributes to confusion and suspicion that participants will 
be exploited rather than protected by either government or private insurers 
or both.29 
Even when the regulatory measures accompanying redistributive taxation 
are designed to change behavior through “carrots” rather than “sticks,” 
these also tend to reinforce a message of resignation to inevitable middle-
class economic insecurity and decline.  Tax subsidies for individual savings 
accounts for health or retirement, in theory, address concerns about the 
perverse effects of redistributive subsidies by narrowly rewarding behavior 
construed as productive and responsible.  In practice, however, these 
“carrots” tend to appear elusive and unfairly regressive, directing benefits to 
a small group of relatively affluent taxpayers.30 
A recent tax policy reform providing more substantial support to the 
middle class is structured to reward family status rather than individual 
market success.  A package of laws enacted from 2001 to 2004,31 and 
renewed by what was called the Middle Class Tax Relief & Job Creation 
Act of 2012,32 reduced income tax rates for married middle-class couples, 
excluding the highest income levels and lower-income families.  These 
reforms lower marital income tax rates compared to individual rates, 
thereby increasing the tax benefits available from marital income splitting 
in families with unequal spousal earnings, especially in more affluent 
 
 27. The “individual mandate” refers to requirements in section 1501 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 18091 and 26 U.S.C. § 5000A). 
 28. See Sarah van Gelder, If the Health Care Mandate Is Struck Down, Single-Payer 
Becomes the Best Choice, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/sarah-van-gelder/single-payer-healthcare_b_1416387.html (discussing 
the constitutional challenge to the health reform legislation, which was later upheld by the 
Supreme Court) [https://perma.cc/WV2E-CX5V]. 
 29. See, e.g., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL:  JANUARY 2014, 
at 15 (2014) (reporting substantial negative perceptions among uninsured Americans). 
 30. See The State of U.S. Retirement Security:  Can the Middle Class Afford to Retire?  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Policy of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and 
Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 30 (2014) (statement of Monique Morrissey, Economist, Econ. 
Policy Inst.) (criticizing tax favored retirement accounts for subsidizing savings by high-
income households rather than encouraging effective retirement savings). 
 31. See Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, 118 Stat. 1166 
(extending the marriage penalty reforms of the Economic Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act of 2001 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 through 2010); 
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 
(accelerating those marital tax changes); Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 301, 115 Stat. 38, 3–54 (gradually expanding the 15 
percent tax bracket and standard deduction for married taxpayers). 
 32. Pub. L. No. 112-96, 126 Stat. 156 (2012). 
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middle-class families.33  This income-splitting device shelters married 
breadwinners’ earnings from the higher rates that would apply if those 
earnings were taxed progressively on an individual basis, providing a bonus 
(compared to single earnings) to the classic breadwinning-homemaker 
marital family structure.  In effect, the marriage bonus subsidizes “affluent 
unpaid husband care” because it operates as a selective standardized 
deduction for the costs of personal household services (like cooking, 
cleaning, child care, or social networking) only for families where a high-
earning breadwinner has potential access to those services by informal 
exchange with a spouse relatively free from the demands of market 
earnings.34  Though the marriage tax reforms eased previous tax penalties 
on dual-earning marital families, neither those families nor single earners 
have the same opportunity to shelter the substantial costs of services for 
sustaining middle-class breadwinning.35 
The breadwinner-homemaker marital family structure that gets this 
special earnings shelter has become out of reach or precarious for most 
middle-class Americans facing stagnant, unsteady, or falling wages—or 
rising costs of housing, medical care, and education.36  Moreover, these 
subsidies skew rewards toward the most affluent families in the targeted 
income range (with a disproportionate racial impact also).37  Further, these 
subsidies reward and encourage the economic insecurity of middle-class 
homemaking spouses, whose family labor generally does not earn them 
equal legal rights to the breadwinners’ earnings or savings.38  
Though it may seem a relic of the past, this recently increased middle-
class family status subsidy embraces a contemporary neoliberal logic.  
Reasonable middle-class citizens must seek security not through 
progressive taxing or spending (on programs such as public child care or 
health insurance), but rather in private relationships of economic 
dependence on discretionary gains from others, even though these 
relationships are fraught with instability and inequality from common 
middle-class life events like divorce, disability, career change, earnings 
insecurity, and persistent household debt. 
Policies construed as tax redistribution are likely to be narrowed not only 
to select groups within the middle class, but also to be curtailed on the 
theory that resources should be targeted to the neediest.  Because 
redistributive taxes are assumed to be grounded in moral or social goals, not 
economic principle, these policies are likely to appear less legitimate the 
more they shift resources to the middle class rather than to the poor.  For 
example, commentators have recently criticized federal loan support for 
 
 33. See generally McCluskey, supra note 21 (criticizing marital income-splitting 
policies both before and after the reforms). 
 34. Id. at 202–09. 
 35. Id. at 117–24 (giving examples of different types of households). 
 36. Id. at 127–28. 
 37. Id. at 128–35 (summarizing findings of a number of scholars analyzing unequal 
effects). 
 38. Id. at 204–16 (explaining how more progressive individualized taxation could more 
fairly recognize homemaking services). 
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graduate or professional education on the ground that this public subsidy 
should only go to students likely to be especially needy or especially 
humble in their economic aspirations.39 
In sum, whether as responsible personal savers, efficient consumers of 
government programs, or deserving beneficiaries of tax redistribution, 
prevailing ideas of tax policy discourage the middle class from drawing on 
public support as a reasonable solution to economic insecurity and 
inequality.  Nonetheless, that does not mean current tax policy constructs 
private markets and personal responsibility as the key to success.  Instead, 
tax policy helps deliver the broader neoliberal message that a new economic 
reality of harsh global competition means that prosperity depends on 
enhanced government support for unequal private wealth creation.  Middle 
class economic well-being, in this view, necessarily depends not on hard-
earned private rights to personal resources or public rights to social 
citizenship, but rather on discretionary, trickle-down spillovers from 
superior economic players. 
II.  TAX AS TRIBUTE TO ELITE CAPITAL? 
Compared to federal income taxes, recent major tax changes in state and 
local government tax policy have received less attention in both tax 
scholarship and popular politics.  State and local taxation generally is 
regressive, with middle-class and low-income households paying a higher 
share of their income than upper-income households.40 
Exacerbating this burden, over the last quarter century, increasingly 
lavish tax support and public financing for elite private business has 
become a defining feature of the American political economy.41  Though a 
full picture of this fiscal landscape is obscured by secrecy, silence, and 
decentralized data, its general contours permeate popular politics and 
everyday life.  Seen up close, the ray of hope for improved middle-class 
prospects from these fiscal policies appears to consist of paying escalating 
public tribute to elite private capital owners on the chance of receiving 
private favors in return. 
 
 39. See Vinal Patel, Grad-School Debt Is Said to Rise Rapidly and Deserve More Policy 
Attention, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 25, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/Grad-
School-Debt-Is-Said-to/145539/ (quoting Jason Delisle’s criticism of lumping graduate and 
undergraduate debt together) [https://perma.cc/8XUZ-ZAFE]. 
 40. See INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, WHO PAYS?  A DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
OF THE TAX SYSTEMS IN ALL 50 STATES 1 (2015), http://www.itep.org/pdf/whopaysreport.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/4EEL-EARX]. 
 41. For some of the groundbreaking reports on this development, see GREG LEROY, THE 
GREAT AMERICAN JOBS SCAM:  CORPORATE TAX DODGING AND THE MYTH OF JOB CREATION 
(2005); GREG LEROY, NO MORE CANDY STORE:  STATES AND CITIES MAKING JOB SUBSIDIES 
ACCOUNTABLE (1997); Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Corporate Welfare:  A TIME 
Investigation Uncovers How Hundreds of Companies Get on the Dole—and Why It Costs 
Every Working American the Equivalent of Two Weeks Pay Every Year, TIME MAG. (Nov. 9, 
1998), http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/1998/11/02/corp.welfare.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/A7YQ-TKV2]. 
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A.  Public Responsibility for Unequal Private Business Support 
Investigating these business incentive policies nationwide, a 2012 New 
York Times report calculated that state and local governments have been 
giving more than $80 billion a year in tax and spending incentives for 
businesses, largely free of reciprocal obligations and often with little public 
oversight or information.42  Special exemptions from income, sales, and 
property taxes for businesses make up the largest portion of these 
incentives.43  These incentive policies are a phenomenon of the neoliberal 
era, emerging in the 1980s as local governments struggled with the decline 
of middle-class manufacturing jobs and then escalating in size and number 
through the 1990s and 2000s.44 
The resulting subsidies have largely bypassed the small, local firms more 
likely to be owned and managed by middle-class Americans.45  Major 
beneficiaries of these subsidies include many of the largest corporations in 
the world, such as Intel, Boeing, Microsoft, Google, Shell, IBM, Amazon, 
and many Fortune 500 firms.46  Companies receiving over $1 billion in 
cumulative incentives include Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway group 
and Wal-Mart.47 
A large portion of the business subsidies consist of high stakes gambles 
pinning local economic hopes on undiversified “trophy deals.”48  In the 
database produced by the New York Times investigation, from 2007 to 
2012, forty-eight companies nationwide each received over $100 million in 
incentives.49 
Unlike private market investors, local governments not only tend to lack 
sophistication and diversification in their role as venture capitalists, but also 
generally forgo legal rights to significant ownership and control in 
 
 42. Louise Story, As Companies Seek Tax Deals, Governments Pay High Price, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/us/how-local-taxpayers-
bankroll-corporations.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/P8SY-KBDT]. 
 43. See id. (calculating $18 billion in income tax breaks and $52 billion in sales tax 
breaks out of the overall $80 billion annual incentives). 
 44. See PHILIP MATTERA & KASIA TARCZYNSKA, MEGADEALS:  THE LARGEST ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY PACKAGES EVER AWARDED BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1–2, 7 (2013) (reporting the rise in number and size of subsidy awards 
over recent decades). 
 45. See generally GREG LEROY ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, SHORTCHANGING SMALL 
BUSINESS:  HOW BIG BUSINESSES DOMINATE STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES 
(2015), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/shortchanging.pdf (finding 
90 percent of $3.2 billion of subsidies going to big business in a study of fourteen states) 
[https://perma.cc/CP9P-QCHG]. 
 46. See PHILIP MATTERA, GOOD JOBS FIRST, SUBSIDIZING THE CORPORATE ONE PERCENT:  
SUBSIDY TRACKER 2.0 REVEALS BIG-BUSINESS DOMINANCE OF STATE AND LOCAL 
DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES 4 (2014), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/ 
pdf/subsidizingthecorporateonepercent.pdf [https://perma.cc/55SV-QP6T]. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See MATTERA & TARCZYNSKA, supra note 44, at i (reporting that the number of state 
or local subsidy deals larger than $75 million has doubled since 2008). 
 49. Louise Story et al., $100 Million Club, N.Y. TIMES (2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2012/12/01/us/government-incentives.html#co-generalmotors [https://perma.cc/ 
2HG3-M32C]. 
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exchange for these “investments.”  The tax incentives often have been made 
without strong legal “clawback” provisions for enforcing promises, leaving 
governments with little or no power to control the number of jobs produced, 
the pay and conditions of employment, and how long the firm will stay in 
the area.50  Subsidies are not typically conditioned on ongoing compliance 
with environmental, labor, or consumer laws.  Local governments often 
lack good information about whether a given private firm would locate or 
expand in their area without any subsidy.51  Similarly, local governments 
often lack resources to evaluate fully threats by firms to withdraw facilities 
and jobs to locations offering higher subsidies, and this asymmetry creates 
incentives for deception and corruption.52  Many of the incentives do not 
support new economic growth but rather directly fund the relocation of 
existing businesses between states or within a state or city or even 
neighborhood.53 
Despite these concerns, tax policies aimed at attracting business have 
persistent political appeal, rationalized on the theory that initial lost revenue 
will be offset by taxes from growth in jobs and spillover economic activity.  
But assuming that this expected development materializes, it is likely to put 
greater burdens on local government services and infrastructure (for 
example, water, sewer, garbage, roads, services, policing, and schools) 
disproportionately funded by other businesses and residents not granted 
special tax reductions.  Those eroding services and infrastructure are 
precisely what small business leaders often identify as major barriers to the 
growth of middle-class enterprise.54  Though entrepreneurship is often 
hailed as the new economy’s alternative to traditional employment for 
middle-class success, these tax policies may help larger firms crowd out 
innovative small businesses by using government support either directly to 
undercut small business competitors or to subject local small-business 
suppliers to tighter competition. 
 
 50. See generally PHILIP MATTERA ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, MONEY BACK GUARANTEES 
FOR TAXPAYERS:  CLAWBACKS AND OTHER ENFORCEMENT SAFEGUARDS IN STATE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY PROGRAMS (2012), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/ 
files/docs/pdf/moneyback.pdf (finding serious deficiencies nationwide in state efforts to 
measure, require, and enforce performance) [https://perma.cc/S5VD-RQGS]. 
 51. Indeed, extensive expert research has failed to substantiate claims of general 
economic benefit from these subsidies, though the harmful effect on government services is 
clearer. See Alan Peters & Peter Fisher, The Failures of Economic Development Incentives, 
70 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 27, 32 (2004). 
 52. See Story et al., supra note 49 (portraying local officials as outmatched by 
multinational corporations in a “high-stakes bazaar”). 
 53. See generally GREG LEROY ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, THE JOB-CREATION SHELL 
GAME:  ENDING THE WASTEFUL PRACTICE OF SUBSIDIZING COMPANIES THAT MOVE JOBS 
FROM ONE STATE TO ANOTHER (2013), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/ 
pdf/shellgame.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SHR-XPF6]. 
 54. See generally CAROLYN FRYBERGER ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, IN SEARCH OF A LEVEL 
PLAYING FIELD:  WHAT LEADERS OF SMALL BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS THINK ABOUT 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES (2015), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/ 
files/docs/pdf/levelfieldreport.pdf (surveying forty-one small business owners in twenty-five 
states on economic development subsidies) [https://perma.cc/M7M2-P95B]. 
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Nonetheless, public subsidies for large multistate and multinational firms 
have become the norm, so that significant numbers of middle-class jobs and 
spillover economic gains now appear to depend on the heavily subsidized 
local facilities operated by large corporations.  The fact that these earnings 
are relatively insecure and scarce can make voters and politicians even 
more willing to keep gambling for such elusive gains. 
These tax development schemes generally are not the target of national 
commentary advocating rationalizing taxes through careful attention to 
incentive effects and net benefits.  Though promoted as a crucial strategy 
for creating middle-class jobs, the general lack of evidence of results and 
the often shaky prospects for any lasting gain may be largely beside the 
point.  Even if a particular incentive deal seems to have little chance of 
paying off, local support for bad deals may be rational (from the perspective 
of individualized local governments) because of the likelihood that refusing 
to give in to demands of existing or potential large local employers will 
result in highly visible short-term losses.  In local economies where middle-
class jobs are eroding and tax revenue is declining, the competition among 
state and local (and foreign) governments for business investment leaves 
individual governments with little bargaining power in a classic race to the 
bottom. 
Unlike idealized market transactions, to a significant extent these tax 
deals operate as extortion:  a one-way transfer paid by a weaker economic 
agent to induce a more powerful counterparty to refrain from imposing even 
greater unequal economic harm.  On the more powerful side of the bargain, 
some corporate executives nonetheless express doubts about the long-term 
value of orienting business competition toward extracting ever-greater and 
more innovative (including corrupt) forms of public tax support.55  Business 
leaders claim they are forced to play the game under their legal obligation 
to maximize short-term gains for shareholders.56  For example, one leader 
of a local business group noted that his city’s lavish but largely futile 
subsidy wars made him “sick.”57  Acknowledging the pressure driving his 
own participation, this business leader added, “It sounds like I’m talking 
myself out of a job, but there ought to be a law against what I am doing.”58 
B.  Middle-Class Responsibility for Fiscal Austerity 
In this mass shakedown, middle-class and poor citizens generally end up 
financing business subsidies at the expense of their own economic 
opportunity and security.  Many government services and benefits that are 
especially valuable for the middle class (such as education, infrastructure, 
and health) depend heavily on state and local funding subject to limits on 
 
 55. See Story, supra note 42 (reporting the concerns of Hallmark executive Donald J. 
Hall). 
 56. See id. (reporting that officials at dozens of large corporations gave this reason for 
pursuing incentives). 
 57. Id. (quoting Sean O’Byrne, Vice President of the Downtown Council of Kansas 
City). 
 58. Id. 
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deficit spending.  The 2008 financial crisis and resulting recession 
depressed state and local tax revenue, leading to policies of fiscal austerity 
in most state and local governments that have particularly harmed the 
middle class. 
By 2015, for example, almost all states provided less support for higher 
education than they had in 2008, typically resulting in higher tuition and 
cuts in academic programs at a time when advanced education is especially 
important for economic opportunity.59  Similarly, by 2015, the majority of 
states provided less funding for K–12 education per student than in 2007, 
producing an overall loss of jobs for teachers and other school employees.60  
Further, recent federal fiscal policy has exacerbated the pressures on states 
to cut education and health programs due to caps on discretionary spending 
that have reduced federal support for state and local government programs 
to the lowest levels since 1989.61  State and local government spending cuts 
targeting public employees also have reduced middle-class jobs and income 
security.62 
In contrast to popular and expert suspicion of “redistributive” public 
subsidies for middle-class or low-income citizens, however, prevailing 
ideas about tax subtly help differentiate and legitimize the upward transfers 
of “corporate welfare” benefits.  Government support for workers and 
nonwealthy families is often characterized as “redistribution” imposed by 
government fiat based on contested ideas of fairness and equality to the 
detriment of overall economic gain.  In contrast, these business subsidies 
tend to be portrayed as economic development harnessing market forces to 
produce overall growth. 
That is, extravagant public support for large corporations (and often their 
billionaire executives) often has been constructed not as regressive 
“redistribution” but as the going market price necessary for successful 
participation in a harshly competitive global economy.63  By offering 
 
 59. MICHAEL MITCHELL & MICHAEL LEACHMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 
YEARS OF CUTS THREATEN TO PUT COLLEGE OUT OF REACH FOR MORE STUDENTS 1 (2015), 
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/5-13-15sfp.pdf (reporting that the average 
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 60. MICHAEL LEACHMAN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, MOST STATES 
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org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/12-10-15sfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG8C-G56L]. 
 61. Michael Leachman, Federal Support for Most State and Local Programs Headed to 
50-Year Low, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES:  BLOG (Sept. 24, 2015, 2:00 PM), http:// 
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 62. See DAVID COOPER, MARY GABLE & ALGERNON AUSTIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE 
PUBLIC-SECTOR JOBS CRISIS:  WOMEN AND AFRICAN AMERICANS HIT HARDEST BY JOB 
LOSSES IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2012), http://www.epi.org/files/2012/bp339-
public-sector-jobs-crisis.pdf (reporting that public employment cuts particularly affect 
women and African Americans) [https://perma.cc/DM8P-W65S]. 
 63. See PHILIP MATTERA ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, TAX BREAKS AND INEQUALITY:  
ENRICHING BILLIONAIRES AND LOW-ROAD EMPLOYERS IN THE NAME OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 12 (2014), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/ 
taxbreaksandinequality.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX4N-7FSD]. 
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escalating subsidies despite the risk of destructive results and dubious gains, 
government leaders (and the voters who support them) can nonetheless 
appear to be hard-nosed and responsible leaders accommodating a new 
economic reality of scarce, concentrated, and highly mobile capital.  But 
because the public incentive payments are not bargains granting a 
meaningfully enforced right to goods or services in return, this price 
operates more like a tax or tribute paid to the corporations out of 
dependence on their undemocratic and superior power. 
C.  Taxes Structured to Cultivate Subordinates, Not Citizens 
Some new state and local incentive policies go further to construct 
middle-class benefits as a resource to be tapped by government for the 
benefit and control of private capital.  This section discusses two examples:  
first, channeling business subsidies directly through workers’ wages; 
second, channeling business subsidies directly through public higher 
education. 
1.  Employee Income Tax Diversion 
First, a recent state tax innovation provides for corporations directly to 
extract economic development subsidies from middle-class earnings 
through diversions from workers’ personal income taxes.  A 2012 report by 
Good Jobs First (a group advocating for subsidy reform) showed that 
sixteen states provided for over 2700 companies to receive some or even all 
of the state personal income taxes withheld from their workers’ paychecks 
(either by directly appropriating the taxes withheld or by receiving grants or 
tax credits keyed to the withheld wages).64  A significant portion of these 
tax policies have been implemented since 2009,65 with employers reaping a 
total of nearly $700 million annually, directly from their workers’ wages.66  
Major national corporations that have been given these direct benefits from 
wage taxes include Tyson Foods, Goldman Sachs, Procter & Gamble, 
Nissan, and Boeing.67  In 2008, New Mexico used wage withholding as part 
of the $130 million state funding package used to attract a solar energy 
panel manufacturing facility promoted by predictions it would create 
thousands of jobs.68  After less than two years in operation, the German 
 
 64. PHILIP MATTERA ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, PAYING TAXES TO THE BOSS:  HOW A 
GROWING NUMBER OF STATES SUBSIDIZE COMPANIES WITH THE WITHHOLDING TAXES OF 
THEIR WORKERS 12–16 (2012), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/ 
taxestotheboss.pdf (discussing five states with programs extracting 100 percent of workers’ 
income tax withholdings and many others providing for diversion of over half of tax 
withholdings) [https://perma.cc/UQR6-A9P6]. 
 65. Id. at 15–16. 
 66. Id. at 12. 
 67. Id. at 17–21. 
 68. Id. at 18. 
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corporate owner closed the plant, keeping about $12 million in state 
government grants.69 
These personal income diversion policies stem in part from the fact that 
large corporations have been so successful in minimizing taxes that state 
and local governments are running short on substantial opportunities for 
further exemption from state, property, and corporate income taxes.70  
Workers’ personal income tax payments therefore have become additional 
resources tapped by governments to “buy”—or, more accurately, “donate 
to”—private capital controlled by others.  In effect, these tax incentives 
require workers to finance their own (insecure) jobs out of their own wages 
(without ownership or control rights in return), taking the idea of tax 
incentives for “self-reliance” much further than the federal tax-favored 
savings accounts or earned income tax credits. 
In addition, this tax design constructs public spending as an 
individualized direct transfer from private employees to private 
corporations, seemingly casting aside the role of government as a mediating 
public authority.  This direct diversion of tax revenue seems to underscore a 
popular sense that middle-class citizens only superficially exercise 
democratic control over government fiscal policy, given the political 
influence of big money and external pressures from the tough global 
competition for economic development. 
Moreover, this direct tax diversion further lowers expectations that tax 
incentives will produce lasting economic growth.  Reductions in taxes for 
new private business development in theory carry at least the potential for 
some degree of offsetting personal tax revenue over the long term from the 
jobs created.  In contrast, these subsidies are structured to preclude this 
indirect gain to public resources, especially because these personal income 
tax diversions are often in addition to other tax reductions. 
Though individual workers may gain from the wages from subsidized 
jobs, with some possible spillover effects boosting sales and property taxes, 
their diverted income tax payments will mean income taxes on other 
middle-class workers and businesses are strained or increased to cover 
existing government programs.  Faced with declining tax revenue, stagnant 
or declining middle-class income, and pressure to continue to attract capital 
with low taxes, governments are likely to respond with spending cuts 
especially affecting middle-class workers, including cuts in the public 
employment and public employee benefits that have been a major source of 
middle-class security and buying power in many communities. 
 
 69. Rob Nikolewski, New Mexico Takes Another Stab at a Big Solar Venture, 
WATCHDOG.ORG (Apr. 3, 2015), http://watchdog.org/209845/new-mexico-solar-city/ [https:// 
perma.cc/HJH7-FF4R]. 
 70. DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, THE FINE PRINT:  HOW BIG COMPANIES USE “PLAIN ENGLISH” 
TO ROB YOU BLIND 236 (2012). 
2016] TAX AND UNEQUAL ECONOMIC GROWTH 2715 
2.  Higher Education As Business Tax Subsidy 
A second innovation draws tax support for private economic 
development directly from public higher education.  Governments have 
long promoted public higher education as a means to economic 
development, using government funding to support academic institutions, 
students, and faculty; to build research facilities; and to create an educated 
workforce that can then attract and benefit private businesses.71  In the last 
several years, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo has taken this idea to a 
new level. 
In 2013, the Governor launched a new tax incentive program called 
START-UP NY,72 making the state’s public higher education institutions 
“tax-free development zones” for qualifying new, expanding, or relocating 
high-tech businesses and start-ups (excluding professional services, 
hospitality and restaurant industries, retail and wholesale, and energy 
production and distribution).73  For business operations in the tax-free 
campus zones, the program offers ten years of complete exemption from 
state business taxes, sales and use taxes, telecommunications excise taxes, 
local commuter taxes, and real estate leasing or transfer taxes.74  In addition 
to these business tax benefits, the program exempts personal income of all 
new employees for these business operations from individual state taxation 
for the first five years, and then for an additional five years this personal 
income tax exemption is limited to $200,000 in income for individuals or 
$300,000 for taxpayers filing a joint return.75 
Program publicity explains that by tying these tax-free zones to academic 
institutions, businesses will have access to research facilities and personnel 
(including low-cost or free labor from students and perhaps faculty).76  In 
turn, the publicity claims that faculty will benefit from opportunities for 
research supporting the businesses, and students will benefit from 
 
 71. See generally ELIZABETH POPP BERMAN, CREATING THE MARKET UNIVERSITY:  HOW 
ACADEMIC SCIENCE BECAME AN ECONOMIC ENGINE (2012) (analyzing historical development 
of industry-university partnerships such as in biotechnology). 
 72. The full program name is “SUNY Tax-free Areas to Revitalize and Transform 
Upstate NY.” See A New Chapter for New York, SUNY, https://www.suny.edu/impact/ 
business/start-up-ny/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) (promoting website for the program) 
[https://perma.cc/F4JW-XRFR]. 
 73. Press Release, N.Y. State Governor, Governor Cuomo Launches Start-Up NY 
Program at International Conference in New York City (Oct. 22, 2013), https://www. 
governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-launches-start-ny-program-international-conference-
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 74. 2013 N.Y. A.B. 8113, enacted June 24, 2013, as 2013 N.Y. Laws 68, creates the new 
Article 21 of the New York Economic Development Law (codified at N.Y. ECON. DEV. LAW 
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opportunities for on-campus internships, jobs, and experiential learning.77  
The State University of New York (SUNY) highlights the program as an 
example of its leadership in “[l]everaging our position as New York’s 
premiere driver of economic activity” and “creating an entrepreneurial 21st 
century college campus.”78 
State policy has combined these new generous subsidies for private 
businesses with new sacrifices from SUNY students, faculty, and staff.  
Under threats of major layoffs as part of the Governor’s plan to cut $450 
million from state workers, SUNY employee unions agreed to several years 
of wage freezes (followed by modest raises), increased health insurance 
costs, and “deficit reduction” involuntary furlough days.79  The Governor’s 
higher education initiatives also have implemented five years of annual 
increases in student tuition, with additional increases in fees for some 
campuses.  Though the tuition increases have been relatively modest, they 
hit at a time of recession straining many middle-class and low-income 
families, building on twenty years of SUNY tuition increases averaging 6.7 
percent annually as state funding has declined.80  Unlike the subsidized 
businesses on campus, SUNY workers and students and the private 
businesses that serve them on campus will continue to pay income, sales, 
and other taxes. 
The first year of the START-UP NY program supported seventy-six new 
jobs in thirty businesses, only four of which moved from out of state.81  
Examples of businesses receiving the benefits included one relocating from 
the center of a small village to a local industrial park a mile away and 
another, already located next to a campus, which moved to a neighboring 
building to qualify.82  Although businesses in the program do include a 
number of middle-class entrepreneurs, some of these may not benefit much 
from the tax incentives because their business ventures are unlikely to 
generate significant revenue or salaries in their initial years.83 
 
 77. See, e.g., START-UP New York:  A New Chapter for New York, SUNY, SUNY, 
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Adding to concerns about the impact of uncertain economic development 
gains and lost tax revenue, the state spent over $45 million in initial 
advertising for the program.84  An investigation by the State Comptroller 
faulted this expensive marketing effort for its failure to identify goals or 
expected outcomes beyond broad and vague references to creating jobs.85  
In response, the Chief Executive Officer of the economic development 
corporation operating and marketing the program defended its success in 
terms of “changed perceptions,” such as showing businesses that the state 
“[has] its act together” and is “back in the game.”86 
Indeed, this program is evidence that cultural, symbolic, and political 
change should be understood as the overarching purpose of tax incentive 
policies.  New York’s tax-free campus development initiative appears 
tailored particularly to change perceptions of the purpose and place of 
public higher education and more deeply to change perceptions of 
responsible middle-class citizenship and democratic government. 
These campus-based tax incentives represent a message that the new 
economy requires enhanced public support for private capital development 
combined with more personal responsibility for human development.  
Reflecting a broader shift in ideology of productivity and dependency, the 
SUNY-based tax incentive program positions the selected businesses as 
specially deserving of public support.  In contrast, students, faculty, and 
other workers on campus (and the private campus businesses that serve 
them) are treated as especially dependent on the jobs and resources 
promised by outside entrepreneurs.  As passengers on a more powerful and 
important economic engine driven by others, students, faculty, staff, and 
their service providers are expected to bear the increased costs and bumps 
of that ride as the market price of their position of relative unproductivity. 
Consistent with general neoliberal ideology, which idealizes unequal and 
undemocratic government economic support, this is a vision where 
government takes on the role as business partner, but in a subordinate 
position without equal rights to control or to share in gains.  The SUNY 
program’s message goes further than promoting economic revival through 
innovative business entrepreneurship or new technology.  That mission is 
commonly advanced by direct public spending for academic programs, 
student scholarships, research and development, job training programs, or 
small business development programs.  But by instead rewarding a small 
number of firms for affiliating with local academic institutions, and by 
giving academic leadership significant power to select, manage, and gain 
from those business subsidies, the program signals a step away from ideals 
of both academic independence and market independence. 
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In a kind of clientele relationship between academic institutions, 
businesses, and state political leaders, the campus is charged with 
encouraging research and teaching that benefits the specific companies 
identified as its partners and with justifying the highly politicized program 
by aiding the company’s success.  For example, the Governor proposed to 
provide salary bonuses to state campus presidents and professors based on 
their success in attracting and generating profits for businesses in the 
program.  However, that proposal was withdrawn after the legislature’s 
Higher Education Committee Chair raised concerns about academic 
integrity and conflicts of interest.87 
The program appears designed to promote a popular impression of 
political propaganda and cronyism more than substance, with marketing 
tailored more toward promoting the Governor than informing businesses of 
the intricate selection criteria and application process.  The deeper and 
subtler public perception may be to confirm suspicions that economic 
success—in higher education as elsewhere—depends less on pursuing hard 
work, economic or societal value, and integrity and more on cultivating 
relationships likely to bestow favors in exchange for loyalty or docility.  
The cultural change produced by these programs, in other words, is less 
about producing viable economic growth and more about lowering middle-
class expectations for benefiting from economic growth—or even from 
democratic political citizenship. 
III.  CHALLENGING TAX IDEAS OF DEMOCRATIC POWERLESSNESS 
To better challenge fiscal policies driving unequal austerity, we must 
change two underlying ideas:  first, that productivity depends primarily on 
private capital and second, that current equal prosperity is limited by 
economics, not politics.  Instead, the public power to tax and spend is a 
fundamental source of economic growth, fundamentally grounded in 
political citizenship not private transactions. 
These ideas have been impeded by optimal tax theory,88 which “balances 
the benefits of redistribution against the inevitable costs of tax-induced 
distortions to produce a welfare-maximizing regime.”89  Though real tax 
policy bears little resemblance to this theory’s ideal,90 the theory 
nonetheless powerfully fuels scholarly and political acceptance of policies 
of inequality as sound economics, rather than as elitist interest and 
ideology.91  But a more complete economics rejects the idea that tax 
“distorts” a naturally “welfare-maximizing,” pre-political economic order 
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driven by free individual preferences, especially because that naturalized 
market vision omits an economic analysis of money.92  Modern money 
theory explains that political and legal systems for creating, regulating, and 
distributing money are fundamental to economic prosperity and stability, 
necessarily shaping (not “distorting”) and facilitating private exchanges of 
goods and services.93 
For governments with substantial control of their own currency—like the 
U.S. federal government—this macroeconomics of money shows that the 
primary purpose of taxation is not to raise revenue from private production 
for public spending.94  Instead, with sovereign power over currency, public 
funds can be created “through keystrokes.”95  Although inflation can 
potentially limit that power, that risk is far more confined, contextual, and 
uncertain than typically assumed by simplified neoclassical economics.  
Instead, the economic costs and benefits of public money creation depend 
on the contingent, complex value-laden questions of how that money is 
spent and invested and how effectively taxes and other forms of regulation 
help steer economic and political activity toward the productivity, stability, 
and legitimacy that will help maintain currency value.  Taxation is 
primarily and properly regulatory, not revenue raising.96 
With a more accurate understanding of the macroeconomics of tax, we 
can see nonwealthy citizens as economically deserving of fiscal policy 
skewed in their favor, not as beneficiaries of “redistribution” or as 
“consumers” who must struggle to “buy” these favors with their taxes.97  
Instead, nonwealthy democratic citizens are potentially collective producers 
and owners of overall economic well-being, equally capable of and entitled 
to use the productive power of government for their benefit.  The inherently 
public and political power to produce and control currency means that 
government can stimulate, lead, and regulate economic production without 
being dependent primarily on satisfying the demands of private capital. 
Using tax policies to benefit particular social goals and to advance 
equality is not “redistribution” that deviates from normal or normative 
private economic maximizing, but rather reflects the core power of taxation 
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to direct the economy toward particular, inevitably contested, visions of 
economic well-being.  Similarly, disproportionate taxes on the wealthy do 
not risk “distorting” otherwise normal and natural production, but rather can 
redirect economic production toward broader, fairer, and more sustainable 
economic growth and more stable, legitimate, and fair politics (for example, 
controlling the oligarchic political power of extreme wealth).  Further, tax 
incentives can better enhance middle-class security not by rewarding 
individualized earning and saving subject to control of private capital, but 
by recognizing the greater economic power and security that is possible 
when middle-class citizens act collectively through government. 
Repositioned as productive drivers of economic growth, ordinary workers 
and taxpayers can better claim legitimate authority to ensure ample 
government support for the infrastructure, health and education, social 
insurance, regulatory systems, and high-waged, environmentally sustainable 
jobs that will better enable and protect their private income and assets.98 
State and local governments (like many nations) that lack the public 
fiscal power derived from sovereign currency can nonetheless develop legal 
institutions to reduce public dependency on mobile private capital.  In the 
United States, the recent austerity, deindustrialization, and job losses facing 
state and local governments could be alleviated by federal spending creating 
capital for state and local governments to use for economic and social 
development.  Along with providing an alternative supply of job-creating 
capital, state and local governments could better ensure broad public 
benefits from private capital through federal law restricting location-based 
corporate subsidies as discriminatory interstate trade barriers, as the 
European Union has done to a significant extent.99 
CONCLUSION 
The middle class’s dependency on elite private capital for economic 
development and security is caused by politics and ideology, not by natural 
or inevitable economic constraints.  The collective fiscal and monetary 
power of the U.S. federal government is constituted by “we the people,” 
and it can be used to increase opportunity and security broadly if that policy 
is under democratic control of citizens.  For that power to be realized, we 
need a different tax story that makes public support for the economic and 
social well-being of the vast majority of citizens the benchmark for 
reasonable and responsible tax policy, not a presumptively unproductive 
“distortion.” 
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